Howard Stein, Olu Ajakaiye and Peter Lewis (*editors*)
DEREGULATION AND THE BANKING CRISIS IN NIGERIA
A Comparative Study

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THEORY, CHANGE AND SOUTHERN AFRICA'S FUTURE

Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future

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Unstated Places – Rereading Southern Africa

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Introduction

The very visible increase in regional efforts by states in many parts of the globe has again generated an academic interest in such efforts. This is, of course, not the first time in the century or so of systematic thinking about regionalism in the field of international relations (IR). The torturous developments of the European Union generated significant academic effort during the 1950s and the 1960s which sometimes even spilled over into investigations of the non-European world. The current interest, emerging as it is after almost two decades of disciplinary silence on matters of regional concern, tends to be based on the theoretical models and ideas introduced during the earlier period. This is understandable but not necessarily helpful, especially if these models are resurrected without a critical eye towards their implicit and explicit assumptions.

The nexus of power and knowledge so eloquently elaborated by Foucault is nowhere more visible than in the discipline of IR. If the social sciences in general have always been a 'state centric activity' (Taylor, 1996: p. 19), then IR theory has been the most explicit in its links to and reliance on state power. Since its formal origins after the First World War, it has been increasingly concerned with determining the language which 'is used to maintain the hegemony of [a] privileged discourse' (Dear, 1988: p. 266). This discourse consists of unquestioned assumptions about the nature of global politics, the actors which participate in it and the strategies and policies which warrant attention. Nowhere is the power of this discourse more visible than when teaching a course on IR theory to students in the US who have, on the whole, little knowledge of and exposure to issues of a global nature

and yet have a fully formed imagery of the nature of global affairs. This is the crux of Foucault's argument: the power/knowledge nexus manifests precisely in the unquestioned acceptance of a 'common sense' meaning while eschewing any analysis of the manner in which this 'common sense' is constructed and maintained (Solomon in Chapter 3 being a case in point).

The same can be said for the theorizing about regionalization. It is my purpose in this chapter to challenge this discourse and, instead, call for a radically open dialogue about regionalization and the meaning of regions with a specific focus on Southern Africa. My effort in this chapter is based primarily on conceptualizations of space and how these can provide an avenue for such a dialogue. In the following section I will outline a critical review of regional theory in IR to be followed by a reintroduction of space into the debate about IR and regions. The third section will provide one perspective from which to read Southern Africa and the final section will offer suggestions for future directions of this dialogue.

IR theory and statism

As with any academic discipline, international relations has its 'lore' of foundational texts and theoretical battles fought over its core assumptions and foundations. Part of such 'lore' is the obligatory reference to the 'great debates' which have marked its development since 1919. However, one question which was not part of these 'debates' was the basic assumption that states are the primary if not the only actors in international relations. While the Liberals believed that the causes of war were related to 'bad' states negotiating in secret (Wilson, 1996), Realists maintained that the drive for power existed in all human beings and therefore, by extension, in all states like some sort of international original sin (Morgenthau, 1960). Waltz (1959; 1979) dismissed either notion and, as one of the original neo-realists, claimed that the workings of the system, specifically anarchy, was the reason behind the recurrence of war. What is common to all these positions is the basic description of states as personified entities, as 'hyper individuals'. The crudest example of such an anthropomorphism is the appropriation of the Rousseauian image of the stag hunt by Waltz (1959: p. 167 *et seq.*), but others equally embraced such individualized notions.

There is an interesting paradox here and it transcends the supposed distinctions between the parties of the 'debate'. States are ascribed the qualities of 'primitive individuals' (Sylvester, 1992: p. 157), that is,

selfishness, lust for power, and so on. These 'qualities' are taken from the worst notions held of human beings outside the bounds and strictures of society. Yet, the fact that human beings in everyday life do not exhibit these tendencies, except in extreme circumstances, is explained by the 'civilizing' role of society. In other words, human beings are assumed to have overcome or controlled these tendencies in our lives only because they live in a social context which imposes hierarchical structures. The paradox, of course, lies in the assumption that the very institutions which keep our worst tendencies in check also inherit these tendencies only to display them at the international level. How can it be that eminently social constructs, that is, states, exhibit the archetypal human behavior which they are supposed to control in the first place? This Janus face of the state as protector of order on the one hand and creator of disorder on the other pervades the intellectual propositions on either side of the first 'great debate' without ever being recognized or properly theorized.

It is clear that the process of turning the state into a 'hyper individual' is problematic to say the least but even if we were to accept this transfiguration for the moment, there is still no reason to accept the assumption that these individualized states must therefore exist in an anarchic system. The latter notion achieves common sense status only as a result of the unquestioned transfer of the basic tenets of liberal philosophy of the individual to the state, particularly the state of nature images employed by Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau and others. In developing the liberal theory of society, Hobbes and others created fictional human beings, fictional men to be correct, who, in the words of Christine Di Stephano, appear like 'orphans who have raised themselves, whose desires are situated within and reflect nothing but independently generated movement' (1983: p. 639). These 'rugged individual' men[1] interact with each other only on combative or contractual terms and the latter type of interaction is only possible through the intervention of the Leviathan.

Once this image is employed in IR, states take the places of individuals and, just as the Hobbesian man appears out of nowhere like a mushroom, states exist without a historical dimension which is concerned with origins and trajectories. Just as the Hobbesian man is doomed to continuous warfare without the intervention of the Leviathan, states in the international system face a similarly dangerous future. There is no sense of connections between states, that one state's existence is tied to, made possible by or otherwise connected with another state's existence. They exist as autonomous, isolated entities, just like billiard balls,

except that they generate their movement from within. Most importantly, the anthropomorphic conception of the state robs it of any spatial quality. Instead of a particular spatial extension, shape and place, the state is reduced to an idealized, disembodied, one-dimensional entity which exists only in the temporal dimension. This despatialized state then becomes a common sense entity, something no longer questioned and analysed.

This exclusion of space from the analysis is, in my opinion, a major reason for the inability of IR theory to come to grips with regionalization and globalization. For it is the abstraction of the state, the hyper-individualization referred to above, which turns the state into an idealized entity without any spatial dimension. By endowing this entity with the human qualities envisioned in liberalism, behaviour is automatically limited to conflictive or contractual relations, the latter being the only possible cooperative behavior. In the social contract story of liberalism, contractual (cooperative) relations are only possible if guaranteed through an institution which has monopolized access to the means of violence, the state. It is this absence of violence in society which makes contractual relations possible. In international relations, the absence of this monopolization of the means of violence is taken to be one of the basic constituent aspects of the system. In other words, the entire anarchy problematic (Ashley, 1988) which is the foundational myth of IR relies on the despatialized, individualized image of the state.

In light of the preceding arguments, it is not surprising that theoretical efforts to deal with cooperative behavior of states have, on the whole occupied marginal positions in the field and the analysis of regionalism has been one of the victims of this dominance of the anarchy problematic. This is not the place to provide an in depth review of regional integration theory (see also Holden and Odén in this volume). However, a few points will demonstrate the manner in which the despatialized statist nature of IR theory has influenced the analysis of regions.

Whereas the pioneer of theorizing on cooperative behavior, David Mitrany, still conceived of multiple overlapping spaces as the solution to the problems of modern politics, those who took his functionalist theory as a starting point to analyse regionalization in Europe quickly abandoned the non-statist perspective and reasserted the state as the central actor in regional projects. Mitrany envisioned a functional system based on the transfer of loyalty from existing social-nationalist centres to new functional entities which provided their respective

services, in effect an integration of functions at whatever happened to be the most appropriate scale. Haas a major proponent of neo-functionalist theory on the other hand, saw integration as a transfer of loyalty from old centres of political power to a new centre of power, replacing multiple pre-existing centres of power with a single new centre (Haas, 1958: p. 16). Instead of the decentralized collection of functional agencies envisioned by Mitrany, Haas substituted a new 'super state' for the previously independent states.

Efforts to address regionalization in the context of the periphery of the world system tended to follow the lead of Europe centred analysis. Few efforts were undertaken to unravel the overlapping puzzles made up of the multiple layers of ethnicity, statehood and proto-nationalism which constitute current peripheral and semi-peripheral states. As Vaitsos (1978: p. 720) has pointed out, there has been a concern with the methodology of integration rather than a concern with the socio-economic circumstances in which integration occurs in the periphery of the world economy. This emphasis on the methods used, that is, free trade areas, customs unions, policy coordination, was always based on the assumption that the goal of integration was that of improved development, industrialization, and so forth (compare Du Pisani in this volume).

Embedded in the economic development debate, integration efforts were regarded as tools for development and consequently were analysed with regard to their efficacy towards reaching that goal. This is true both for the neo-liberal perspective of 'northern' economists and the *dependencia* approach of the ECLA-inspired Latin American efforts. If integration efforts failed, and that was the norm, the failure was situated at various levels, be it failure to distribute the benefits and costs equally, lack of sufficiently strong regional institutions to enforce individual state compliance (see also Holden in this volume). Rarely was the reason for failure located in the unquestioned transfer of 'northern' ideology and concepts for the solution of entirely different problems:

> To put it bluntly, the economic integration failures of the underdeveloped countries are an impressive monument to the professional arrogance of most 'conventional wisdom' economists from the industrially advanced North, the intellectual sheepishness of the flock of their unconditional followers in the underdeveloped areas both on the technical and policy-making levels, and the inability of the States and dominant political structures to work out any sort of longer-term

development policies suitable for the solution of problems which the present-day advanced societies never faced, even at the beginning of the first industrial revolution in the eighteenth century.
> (Wionczeck, 1978: p. 781).

The conventional wisdom referred to above includes, in particular, the despatialized image of the state as the sole representation of a society's interest outside the boundaries which are assumed to constitute that state.

The spaces of global politics

Let me begin with the obvious question: What is a region? Although we all use the term and we all assume that it has a clear meaning, the reality is far from it. First employed in the eighteenth-century to designate a 'natural' physical division of the land, the term was conceived of in terms of 'the integration of all phenomena (natural and human) of an area into an individual unit distinct from those of neighboring areas' in the nineteenth-century (Kimble, 1996: p. 493). Generally, most proponents of the term in the field of geography agreed on the fact that regions existed while disagreeing on which factors could best be used to define the extent of such regions. Early conceptualizations of the region focused on the physical characteristics such as climate, geology or vegetation. Dissatisfaction with this mode of definition – 'Nature's "curtains" are fashioned of more malleable material than iron!' (ibid., p. 498) – led to an emphasis on social phenomena (see Swatuk in Chapter 12 below). However, all attempts to arrive at a coherent universal definition failed, leading to the admission that 'our regions are merely fragments of land whose determination involves a considerable degree of arbitrary judgement' (ibid., pp. 498–9). Kimble concludes that the standard concept of the region was in effect a continental European concept 'sired by Feudalism and raised in the cultural seclusion of a self-sufficing environment' (ibid., p. 507).

While Kimble took the indeterminacy of the term as an argument for its abolition, I would like to suggest here, that the term does have utility as long as we are willing to accept its fluidity and embeddedness in larger contexts. A region is first and foremost a spatial entity at a different scale from those usually associated with global politics – the global scale of the globe, the intermediate scale of the state and the local scale (see Taylor, 1981; 1982). It may exist both at a scale between the local and the state – most regional studies in geography are concerned with

such regions – and between the scale of the state and the globe, the scale in which we are interested in this volume. While this statement does not seem dramatically different from the received wisdom of the IR 'lore' I suggest here that conceiving of regions as spaces represents the first step towards the dialogue on regionalism advocated in the introduction to this section.

Space is not something we usually think about in our daily lives, except in so far as it manifests itself as distance to be overcome. Generally, we assume space to be a container of people and things. For over two millennia, the Euclidian concept of space has dominated the Western mental representation of space. Euclidian space was homogeneous, smooth and infinitely divisible and constituted the basis for two and three-dimensional geometry. The equivalent of this mathematical conception of space in physics was that of Newtonian absolute space which viewed space as 'a neutral background against which the positions of objects can be pinpointed and their motions described' (Couclelis, 1992: p. 220). This view of space-as-container has also been embraced by international relations (IR) theory in its treatment of the state. IR theory spends little time thinking about space because its practitioners assume that the question of space has already been settled. The state is seen as a fixed unit 'of secure sovereign space' (Agnew, 1994: p. 106) and as a container of society (Taylor, 1994). The international system, in turn, has come to be regarded as an agglomeration of states and a region is simply a smaller agglomeration of states which happen to share a certain geographical proximity.

Yet within the span of the century that is now ending, the introduction of relativistic space in modern physics has ended the Newtonian space-as-container notion and laid the foundation for a conception of space in which its structure 'both influences the distribution and motion of objects and is governed by them' (Couclelis, 1992: p. 221). The classical distinction between matter on the one hand and the empty void on the other hand is untenable in this new physics; likewise Einstein's relativity theory flatly states that 'there is an infinite number of spaces which are in motion with respect to each other' and these spaces are not voids but are full and dynamic, with the power of 'partaking in physical events' (Einstein, quoted in Kern, 1983: pp. 136, 154). These dramatic changes in the conception of space and the world in the natural sciences have had few if any impact on the conception of space in other disciplines. International relations (IR) theory in particular has persisted in embracing the view of space-as-container in its treatment of the state and the global system. One is left to wonder

why, despite these dramatic new visions of the universe and space, the space-as-container view persisted. Lefebvre's observation regarding this question is worth quoting here:

> To picture space as a 'frame' or container into which nothing can be put unless it is smaller than the recipient, and to imagine that this container has no other purpose than to preserve what has been put in it – this is probably the initial error. But is it error or is it ideology? The latter more likely. If so, who promotes it? Who exploits it? And why and how do they do so?
>
> (Lefebvre, 1991: p. 94)

The answers to these questions lie to some extent in the manner in which modernity has fixed space so as to 'privilege historicity and sociality at the expense of spatiality' (Soja, 1993: p. 114). With the emergence of post Enlightenment rationalism, both in its idealist and materialist forms, modern thinking fell into the trap of what Lefebvre calls the 'double illusion' of transparency and opacity (1991: p. 27). The illusion of transparency perceives of space as 'luminous' and easily apprehensible – 'innocent [and] free of traps or secret places' (ibid., p. 28) – with a clear correspondence between social space and space as mental construct; the illusion of opacity, on the other hand, conceives of an objective, 'opaque' space as a natural thing which has more reality than thought and which can be measured and described (Soja, 1996: pp. 63–5). However, it would be incorrect to regard this double illusion as a conflict of competing philosophies. Instead, each is linked to the other so that '[t]he rational is thus naturalized, while nature cloaks itself in nostalgias which supplant rationality' (Lefebvre, 1991: p. 30).

I propose here that it is more helpful to think of social space as a social product (ibid.), rather than as a pre-given normalized abstraction or a mere mental construct. Like any production process, the production of specific spaces, be they buildings, cities or states 'imposes a spatial and temporal order upon related operations' (ibid., p. 71) so that the manner in which societies use and structure space ultimately determines the physical appearance of that space, which in turn has an impact on social practices. Social space exists both as the precondition for and the outcome of social action and, as such, articulates the relationships of things and actions in their simultaneity (ibid., p. 73).

This role of guiding social action while being the product of it is a crucial aspect of social space. Since it prohibits certain social actions at any given time, those who wish to commit such action will always feel

the need to resist, subvert, and overcome space that has been produced previously and by others. Whether or not this need leads to action depends on the specific constellation of social forces. Social space will be altered if the social forces which experience it as a constraint achieve sufficient weight. But the alteration itself again constitutes an obstacle to further social action in the future. In Harvey's words, '[s]pace can be overcome only through the production of space' (Harvey, 1985: p. 60). The specific space of any particular time period therefore reflects the general economic structure and mode of production of the society which produces it. Thus for example, the space produced by the Xhosa people did not lend itself easily to colonial appropriation in that the different conceptions of land tenure and usage presented themselves as obstacles to the expansion of white settlers.[2]

With the arrival of Europeans in the Americas, the entire world was in one way or another tied into what I call global social space. This global social space consists of interconnected layers (Lefebvre, 1991: p. 86) whose textures are the result of human action. Texture in this particular context refers to the appearance, that is, the landscape that can be identified at any point in this space during a given time span. States simply constitute one layer of this space with state boundaries conceived of as ambiguous continuities (ibid., p. 87), rather than as clear divisions. In short, the global system did not emerge as an additive outcome of the emergence of states, just as the global economy did not emerge out of the addition of multiple national economies (von Braunmühl, 1976: p. 276). Rather, states and national economies represent different layers of one global social space; they are the constitutive components of that space contributing to its richness and variation. These layers are historically contingent, not permanent, and subject to changes as the constellations of social forces which created them change. Layers may disappear and new layers may emerge in response to new and different dynamics. Particular layers may be more enduring than others and may appear as an obstacle to forces attempting to create new layers or consolidate existing layers. But the degree to which layers appear as obstacles depends on the relative importance of closure versus continuity, in other words, the ambiguous continuities referred to above.

Regions constitute a specific example of layers in the global system. For example, the US National Resources Planning Board described a region as the 'locus of a problem' (Mitrany, 1966: p. 53). This definition is helpful in so far as it de-emphasizes the physical aspects of geography and focuses instead on social relations. Similarly, Martin

(1986, p. 100) viewed the extent of a region as defined by the degree of interconnectedness of production processes. While these definitions based on social relations avoid the problems of geographical arbitrariness, they in turn pose their own problems in that if we accept Taylor's global scale, all production processes everywhere are by definition interconnected. However, such a claim fails to recognize the manner in which different layers of global social space are connected to each other. Regions represent spaces which are constituted through the specific social interactions which, while having a global dimension, always manifest themselves in particular local forms (Taylor, 1981: pp. 186–8). Finally, regions, like all layers, always also have temporal boundaries which articulate the cyclical developments of the world economy at various locales.

Lefebvre (1991: pp. 33, 38 *et seq.*) suggests that the analysis of social space is best approached from a 'conceptual triad' consisting of spatial practice, representations of space and spatial representations. Spatial practice refers to the manner in which social forces produce the spatial structures through which they organize their practices and which is directly apprehendable by the senses. Representations of space refer to the manner in which space is conceived in a society by those who participate in the creation of the dominant discourses. Spatial representations, finally, incorporate both of the previous legs of the triad and refer to 'space as directly *lived*, with all its intractability intact, a space that stretches across images and symbols that accompany it, the space of "inhabitants" and "users"' (Soja, 1996: p. 67). This focus on the actual, lived spaces enables us to analyze 'counterspaces, spaces of resistance to the dominant order' (ibid., p. 68). My objective for the following sections is to outline this conceptual triad as it applies to Southern Africa. The next section will focus on the spatial practices and the representations of space from a macro or state producing perspective.

Spatial practices in Southern Africa

There is little reason to speak of southern Africa as a coherent region before the middle of the nineteenth-century. As a land mass at the southern tip of the African continent it was inhabited by peoples with various modes of social reproduction ranging from the San, who were hunter/gatherers, to the Khoi, who were pastoralists, to the Bantu-speaking mixed farming communities which had established themselves in its eastern part in the aftermath of what Thompson (1995: p. 13) calls a 'migratory drift' from the north two millennia ago.

Omer-Cooper (1994: p. 4) indicates that trade between the Indian Ocean coast and the Eastern Cape area had been established 'by the earlier years of the second millennium AD'. This Indian Ocean connection represented the southwestern end of the extensive and intensive Chinese system of trade which tied Eastern Africa and Southern Africa to the Arab peninsula, India and other parts of the Indian Ocean world (Newitt, 1995: p. 4; Abu-Lughod, 1989).

Although the presence of Europeans in the subcontinent dates back to 1482 when Portuguese ships first arrived at the Congo coast, this presence was limited to coastal areas which initially became part of a vast Atlantic/Indian Ocean region which tied together control over trade routes, the Atlantic slave trade and colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. The most crucial challenge faced by the colonizers was what Braudel calls the 'tyranny of distance'. In terms of spatial production, the overcoming of this distance through the production of space was the basis for the establishment of the Cape Colony and the Portuguese occupation of the East African coast. The spaces initially occupied by Europeans were therefore extensions of other spaces, more specifically the Atlantic space which connected Brazil to the other colonial possessions of Portugal and the Dutch colonial space which linked its possessions in the East Indies to their other trading networks. Once established, however, the new spaces created new possibilities and imposed their own strictures. Bender (1978) provides a cogent analysis of the role of slave trade and the practice of sending convicts to Angola in Angola's development and Newitt (1995) analyses the Portuguese impact on the Indian Ocean trade.

During the early nineteenth century, the combined impact of ecology and European pressures both directly and indirectly led to a massive dislocation and movement of indigenous peoples, usually referred to as the *mfecane*, which had a profound impact on the size of political communities and their respective distribution. These in turn led to the creation of fewer but larger African states, far more organized and bureaucratized than the smaller chiefdoms which had coexisted with one another (see Thompson, 1995: pp. 80–7; Omer-Cooper, 1994: pp. 54–74; Newitt, 1995: pp. 290–96; and Martin, 1987: pp. 866–8) and finalized the settlement patterns of Africans in the subcontinent.

The consolidation of power, the elimination of rival sources of power within specific areas and the bureaucratization of political rule along either military or lineage lines (Martin, 1987: p. 867) facilitated control over the production of desired goods and their flows between these communities while imposing singular control over larger expanses.

These incidents of migrations and state building by indigenous peoples were accompanied by similar activities of the *voortrekkers*, the Dutch speaking descendants of the first European settlers in the Cape. These migrations were inspired by their rejection of increasing anglicization after the official takeover of the Cape Colony by the British, in particular the prohibition of slavery and the legal equalization of Khoikhoi and Europeans in the early 1800s (Manzo, 1996: pp. 77–9).

It is here that we can see the beginning of the creation of a Southern African region. The mass migrations and dispersal of indigenous peoples and *voortrekkers* set up connections from the Orange River in the south to Lake Tanganyika in the north.[3] The treks and paths formed during this process served as the guide for the next defining moment for southern Africa, the discovery of diamonds and gold which turned a secondary interest of British imperialism into a source of mineral riches of massive proportions. In their drive to exploit these and other reported mineral deposits, British imperialists, Cecil Rhodes being the foremost, followed the treks of the *mfecane* and built upon these spatial foundations the infrastructural links which still serve as the routes along which labour migration takes place.

If the migrations of the early and mid nineteenth century laid the foundations for a Southern African region, the discovery of the mineral resources and the efforts to secure their exploitation towards the end of the century constitutes the temporal beginning of that region. It is here that we find the link between state building and the construction of the region. Whereas access to and control over these and other (imaginary or real) resources constituted a crucial part of the drive to establish the various states in the subcontinent, the need to exploit the mineral resources, which, after all, was the basis of state formation, necessitated the creation of a regional space. This process was clearly not uncontested and the conflicts of the period, from the Zulu wars to the South African wars attest to the conflictive nature of the process of spatial production. Once settled, however, the connections between region and state emerged ever more clearly.

In South Africa, the need for labour and capital immediately made the spatial confines of the Union territory an obstacle to be overcome. Since African agriculture as a basis for independent reproduction had not yet been destroyed (see Bundy, 1979), securing the necessary supply of labour constituted the perennial problem which was only exacerbated by the discovery of mineral resources. Similarly, the efforts to establish state power in and demonstrate effective occupation of Mozambique led the Portuguese to grant charters to private companies

in order to complete the administration and pacification of the areas north of the 22nd Parallel. These companies in turn saw their opportunity in making profits by either renting out the indigenous inhabitants as labourers to South African and Rhodesian mine owners and farmers or through the fees and revenues from the regional use of ports and other transport facilities (Newitt, 1995: pp. 361–85) and thus expand the number of labourers that already crossed the boundaries from below the 22nd Parallel.

We see therefore that from the very beginning of Southern Africa as a coherent concept, social forces were actively creating different layers of social space even though they may not have been conscious of it. Ohlson and Stedman (1994: p. 36) point out that this process of 'bordering' eliminated a viable basis for the Portuguese colonies, led to the destruction of the capacity for independent reproduction of African peoples in the region and the resulting 'crystallization of ethnicity' (ibid., p. 37) as a strategy of coping with these disruptions. Mozambique, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) territories and the Protectorates quickly became part of a regional space which was primarily but not exclusively characterized by a pattern of labour flows centred on the mines in South Africa and, to some extend, in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia and the need for agricultural labour throughout the region. A complementary aspect of this region was the circuit of capital which combined British and German capital with some local capital and created the transportation links which were to become the physical structures of this region.

The processes of industrialization, initiated in South Africa and Rhodesia as a result of mineral production, soon began to seek the region as a market for manufactured goods, adding in the process another dimension to the regional space (see Libby, 1987: p. 49; Seidman, 1980: p. 155; and Davies, 1993: p. 73), so that by the beginning of the decolonization process, Southern Africa as a region was defined by an intricate web of relations which consisted of a flow of people (labour), commodities (increasingly manufactures) and capital (both of South African and foreign origin). These flows were facilitated through a network of transportation facilities which, in distinction to networks in other part of Africa, actually helped define the region.

The beginning of the decolonization process brought independence first to Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia and later Lesotho and Swaziland but also the inauguration of the armed struggles which eventually brought independence to the rest of the region and lasted into the 1990s. Decolonization brought to the forefront the problems facing the

majority-ruled states in a regional space which was produced to prevent the majority from ever ruling. From the very beginning of the independence period therefore, attempts to inaugurate regional policies which were geared to oppose the remaining white-minority-ruled states both in ideological and material terms proved to be if not impossible at least extremely costly. From the first implementation of the embargo against Rhodesia in 1965, Zambia in particular had to cope with the fact that the structures and textures of the region presented an enormous obstacle to the pursuit of its policy. One answer was an attempt at reconstructing a part of the region through the Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA) project.

A similar situation developed upon the independence of Mozambique which saw itself faced by the contradictory demands of solidarity with the armed struggle in Rhodesia and its dependence on the revenue from the Rhodesian use of the port of Beira. The connections of southern Mozambique to the Transvaal created a similar situation where the spatial make-up of the region was set in juxtaposition to the policy aims of the revolutionary state. As a result, the Mozambican government found itself in a position of having to rely on revenue produced by its connection to South Africa in the form of labour remittances and railway and port fees for Maputo while also serving as a base and training ground for African National Congress (ANC) fighters. These contradictions ultimately were untenable as the infamous Nkomati Accords highlighted (see Anglin, 1985).

The inauguration of the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference, the predecessor to SADC; see Du Pisani in this volume) in 1980 was hailed as a milestone in the efforts of the anti-apartheid struggle and as a precedent for a new kind of cooperation between peripheral states (see Lee, 1989). Its goals, as outlined in the Lusaka Declaration, are best summarized by two main aspects, reduction of dependence on South Africa and the forging of new regional ties in order to foster equitable development. On the surface, these objectives call for a spatial reorganization of the region, albeit a region which at that time did not include South Africa. It is here that the fundamental problem of SADCC was situated. Its two major goals were in effect contradictory. It proved to be impossible to build a new region while reducing dependence on South Africa since the entire region, as Vale highlights in Chapter 2, had been constructed around South Africa with the peripheral states tightly integrated into the South African core. The region was more than simply a set of inter-state relations which could be rearranged at will.

From the spatial perspective developed here, the SADCC must therefore not be understood as an effort to create a different regional integration but as an effort to escape or circumvent the effects of the existing integration. Clearly, South African destabilization during the 1980s played a significant role in obstructing efforts to create a new regional space (see Johnson and Martin, 1988). At the same time, the record of SADCC also highlights the inability of the states involved to coordinate policies in order to advance new patterns of regional interaction. Østergaard (1989) demonstrated such limits in his study of the tractor industry in the region. Instead, each of the member states sought a way to overcome the strictures represented by the regional space by attempting to extricate itself from the region and embracing a global economy in the form of closer relations to the European Community and the Nordic states (Niemann, 1991).[4]

Representations of Southern Africa

In Lefebvre's view, the representations of space reflect the manner in which space is conceived of in a society. It is the space of 'technocratic subdividers and social engineers – all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived' (Lefebvre, 1991: p. 38). This description could not be more fitting for Southern Africa. Whereas the spatial practices in which social forces engaged during the period in question without doubt contributed to the production of the regional space we call Southern Africa, that very space was conceived of in terms of national states. Imbued with the ideology of nationalism emanating from Europe, the conception of territorial space was considered the sole spatial form in which to secure a political community. The efforts of the *trekboers* to establish their own republics after 1850 demonstrate the power of this territorial conception of space. Similarly, the British efforts to block possibility of a connection between the Portuguese colonies, the *Boer* republics and the German colony of South West Africa reflected the desire to define power in terms of delimited territories.

This is not the place to recount the history of state building in Southern Africa over the past century. Suffice it to say that such efforts were not dramatically different from similar processes in Europe (see Tilly, 1990; 1985). Political forces relied on the resources extracted from economic operators in order to eliminate alternative sources of violence within specific territories which in turn allowed such operators to engage in accumulation. The construction of such delimited spaces,

however, was never without contradictions and these contradictions were contained in the conception of race.

The early European discursive conceptualization of their contact with the indigenous population mostly reflected religious and civilizational prejudices, that is, the characterization of Africans as 'heathens' and 'savages' served as the moral justification for the expropriation of their land, cattle and labour rather than the imputed racial differences (Frederickson, 1981: pp. 54–136). Consequently, there was not yet a clear spatial separation between Africans and Europeans. Even sexual relations reflected the relatively lax attitudes towards spatial/racial mixing (ibid., pp. 108–24).[5]

However, British attempts to impose a more *laissez faire* free labour policy (Ordinance Number 50 of 1828 and the emancipation of slaves during 1834–38) led to a hardening of racial thinking among the Boers. Consequently, once they had created their new republics, the Boers began to establish the ideological basis for the spatial segregation of Africans from Europeans. As late nineteenth-century thinking about race shifted decisively towards the notion that differences between the races were permanent and not erasable through religious conversion or 'civilizing influences' there was little opposition when, after the establishment of the Union, these antecedents were adopted as a whole for the entire Union.

The influence of this racial thinking proved to be the major contradiction in conceiving of Southern Africa in terms of territorial states. The idea of the territorial state depends on the 'inside/outside' distinction so expertly interrogated by Walker (1993). State-building in Europe reflected the transition from a Christian universalism to a rational particularism confined to a specific space which made possible the idea of separation, of spatial differentiation, of public and private and of inside and outside (Ruggie, 1993: p. 151). However, the conceptualizations of race which dominated Southern Africa made such separation and differentiation impossible. The desire to separate Africans from Europeans in spatial terms – formalized in the Land Act of 1913 (and its later amendments) which established the 'native reserves' or 'homelands' which, in turn, served as the basis for the policies of apartheid instituted after 1948 – imposed spatial structures which undermined any attempt to create a uniform 'inside'.

The desire and resulting policies to create spatial structures on the basis of the European conceptualization of race were not limited to South Africa. All over the subcontinent, policies were enacted which regulated the physical presence of indigenous people in so-called

'white' areas.[6] These discourses of space and race ultimately had their meeting point in the body. Spaces were identified by the skin colour of those who were permitted to live through them. It was possible to read off the body of an individual whether or not that individual was in the proper space and the pass laws in South Africa, the housing of labour in hostels and compounds adjacent to mines and, later, manufacturing facilities all reflected this racialization of space in Southern Africa (Bundy, 1992).

In short, although the representations of space were clearly in following with the dominant territorial view, the very racial thinking which dominated both boers and the British, led to policies which weakened the territorial concept, in effect not only creating an 'inside' to be juxtaposed to an 'outside' represented by other states but also creating an 'outside' on the 'inside' which was linked to the 'actual outside'. The creation of the homelands and the eventual sham independence granted to the Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana were but the logical conclusion of the policy began in 1913. But the usual distinction between inside and outside, the primary spatial image of the national state, did not apply in South Africa. The differences between Bophuthatswana or Venda on the one hand and Mozambique, at least southern Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana on the other hand were academic at best.

Spaces of representation in Southern Africa

The production of such new spaces, however, requires the weakening of existing state (and spatial) structures for their success and it is here that I would like to return to the third leg of Lefebvre's conceptual triad, the spaces of representation. Although Lefebvre saw lived spaces primarily as passive or dominated spaces, such spaces also contain the lived experiences of inhabitants and contain therefore the possibility for the creation of counterspaces and subversive spaces, they are therefore 'a strategic location from which to encompass, understand and potentially transform all spaces simultaneously' (Soja, 1996: p. 68).

Such counterspaces at the regional level have existed for quite some time. Despite all efforts to impose the stamp of state control on the movement of migrant labour in the region, workers have evaded such controls. Even during the height of migration control through organization such as The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), the number of migrants in the system was outweighed by those who crossed borders illegally. Newitt (1995: p. 489) estimates that besides the 80,000

officially recruited Mozambican workers in South Africa in 1967, some 300,000 were in the country illegally and thus had much larger degree of choice with regard to length of stay, place of work and control over pay.

Similarly, such migrants, both legal and illegal, created their own circuits of commodity flows which had not existed before. First (1983: pp. 126–7) describes the appearance of cement floors, brick houses and a variety of consumer items such as furniture, crockery, and even radios and bicycles. Today similar circuits exist. Hawkers and sidewalk traders from the SADC region who sell their wares in South Africa, for example, export a wide variety of goods. About 75 per cent of those who exported South African goods did so in amounts of R2,000 and above (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). Although there is not yet firm data, anecdotal evidence indicates that similar cross border trade exists throughout the region.

We can therefore imagine regions not only as spatial constructs which facilitate the exploitation of the subcontinent; we can also imagine them as counterspaces, as sites of resistance to such processes. One such imagination is to think of regions as spaces of rights rather than spaces of flows or spaces of places. A region so conceptualized constitutes an integrated space not because of trade flows or institutional apparatuses but because its inhabitants share a commitment to struggle for the same enforceable protections against abuses be they committed by states or corporations.

To conceive of regions as spaces of rights represents a direct challenge to the hegemonic consensus on liberalism. Such efforts transcend the traditional spatial organization by insisting that rights of persons be recognized outside and independent of the national state. They reject the position of the state as the sole arbiter of the rights of 'its' citizens and therefore create new spaces of reference. In some ways the human rights discourse has always represented such a challenge to the state and the spatial make-up of the globe. In practical terms, however, human rights has remained wedded to the state in that the state remains central as the arbiter of such rights. Southern Africa as a space of rights differs from this conception in that such a space envision rights as separate from the spatial confines of the state and, instead embed them in a new space.

A strategy for the creation of Southern Africa as spaces of rights if it aims to go beyond the current spatial/statist divisions cannot, in the end, rely for its success on the very state/spatial structures which were originally the basis for the authoritarian systems which created

Southern Africa in the first place. This is not to say that states have become irrelevant spatial categories. They remain rather crucial spatial layers for a wide variety of reasons. The regional layer, however, if it is to be a counter-hegemonic layer in today's global system, must transcend these spaces.

I propose here that the creation of a multiplicity of links between social movements as a result of which each of the social movements (including labor organizations) constitutes a node in a web can serve as the basis for a regional space of rights. Such a web would constitute an alternative conceptualization of the region because it represents an effort to curtail, at the regional level, the tendencies of globalizing capital to exploit the differences between various places. Exploitation of such differences represents a foundational aspect of global capitalism and a web of links between popular organization may well constitute the best tool to bring into the open this practice. However, this conceptualization of the region as a web constituted by various movements and organizations requires rather significant changes in organizational outlook within and among organizations that have traditionally carried the burden of organizing opposition to global capitalism.

Research into the activities of social movement has mushroomed during the past decade or so. Many of the insights developed have stayed outside mainstream IR literature. It is nevertheless crucial that the insights gained are brought to bear in the study of regionalization. 'Social movements have always arisen under conditions of social distress' (Walker, 1988: p. 26). Consequently, they are by definition local in that the causes which underlie their rise to visibility, while not necessarily local in nature, always manifest themselves in specific forms at various locales. This local nature of social movements is often viewed as their largest shortcoming, an inevitable weakness when it comes to confronting the state.[7]

However, place-boundedness of social movements does not necessarily imply an exclusively local focus. There are numerous examples of 'local' movements which nevertheless maintained links across state boundaries and viewed their mission as one which was not limited by such boundaries. The environmental movement with its focus on the ecosphere of the globe or particular regions is probably the best example. However, the anti-apartheid movements in the US and Europe are equally important examples of local movements with a transnational focus.

The paradox of globalization is that the ever decreasing protections offered by states and the questions of human rights (including both

civil/political and economic/social rights) which are raised as a result are now broadcast around the entire world in real time. In other words, the impact of globalization, while local, nevertheless becomes global as a result of the increased flows of information. The ability to receive such information is, of course, not equally distributed, but there are few places left in the world without either direct or indirect access to means of communications through which social movements can link to others. It is this ability to link up with other like-minded organizations using information technology which makes possible the scenario of a multinodal network at the regional level envisioned here.

One such example can be found in the work currently done by the Southern African non-governmental organization (NGO) community which is attempting to build a network of various NGOs as a counterpoint to state efforts in the region.[8] In response to Article 23 of the SADC charter of 1992 which envisions the incorporation of voices from civil society, these NGOs began to set up their consultative structure in 1996 and became operational in February 1997 as the Southern African Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON). Currently, some 64 organizations from 11 of the 14 member states belong the network representing a wide variety of interests in civil society. At an initial meeting in Malawi in September 1997, SAHRINGON decided to focus its attention on the key areas of policing practices, gender issues and questions related to the freedom of assembly and association. At the 1998 meeting in Zimbabwe, member NGOs determined that the initial focus areas were too narrow and decided to include issues related to persons with disabilities and the large complex of social and economic rights to the agenda. By late 1998, the network was in the process of developing a plan of action based on this agenda.

The general reception of the various states to SAHRINGON has been mixed. Representatives of the organization have been shunned at official SADC meetings and, provisions of Article 23 notwithstanding, consultation with the network has not taken place. A specific example is the launching of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security under the chairmanship of Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe. Throughout the negotiations, no NGOs were consulted despite the fact that various interested organizations had prepared submissions on the training of police forces in human rights issues and related questions. Such obstacles are unfortunately predictable, especially in the early stages of the formation of such a regional network. They also point to the difficulties involved in any effort to overcome states as guarantors of security when one has little choice but to rely on the sympathetic

ear of at least some of the states in the region in order to have an impact.

However, the network approach to constructing regions as spaces of rights faces significant problems. Inequality of resources between members of a network constitute one such drawback. As Macdonald (1995) has pointed out, the role of North American NGOs in Central America has had mixed consequences which, more often than not, were the result of poor information on their partners; combined with a fair degree of paternalism this has resulted in failed projects. Southern Africa has already witnessed this phenomenon to some extent where South African NGOs often engage in regional work with a similar attitude.[9] Furthermore, the view of NGOs as superior vehicles for regional links has to be tempered with the realization that the internal organization of such NGOs is often hierarchical (ibid., p. 35) and therefore can constitute a barrier to full grassroots engagement. In short, the barriers to creating regions as spaces of rights are formidable as are all efforts to produce new spaces.

Nevertheless, social actors, institutions and movements who wish to create counterhegemonic spaces which can provide an effective counterweight to the forces of global/regional accumulation should take advantage of the weakening of the state to create a network of critical social movements which transcends old boundaries in order to challenge those structural and institutional apparatuses whose fundamental purpose is to further accumulation from a location which they themselves created. Such lived spaces, spaces which represent solidarity across traditional boundaries, could represent networks of social movements which are linked in such a way as to avoid the exploitation of differences between various micro-regions. This would be a first step towards creating political community at a local level while avoiding parochial isolation. More generally, however, all efforts to construct and occupy strategic institutions at the regional level in order to counteract corporate power require a full understanding of all the levels of social spatiality at stake, the strength or weakness of the actors and processes located on those levels, and the typically conflictive/complicit nature of their relationship with a capitalism which is, by its very nature, simultaneously everywhere and nowhere at home.

Notes

1. There was clearly no space for women in any of the early modern philosophical constructs. The proto individual was a man and therefore had to display

the qualities deemed masculine then (and now). For an analysis of this gender bias see Di Stephano (1983; 1991), Sylvester (1994) and Tickner (1992).

2. See, e.g., the protracted negotiations and conflicts over the control of the *zuurveld* during 1780–1820 where Xhosa conceptions of space conflicted with white settler conceptions, therefore making coexistence difficult and leading to the forceful expropriation of the Xhosa territory by 1812 (Omer-Cooper, 1994: pp. 32–4, 44–7). A crucial difference in spatial conceptions was that for white settlers, ownership of land was deemed crucial. A young white man needed to have 'his own land' in order to be regarded as a man. The Xhosa, on the other hand, valued ownership of cattle similarly, measuring the wealth and social standing of a man by the number of cattle he owned which lead to a need for grazing land which in turn conflicted with white property claims. It was therefore impossible for a society whose spatial categories rested on the ownership of land as a means to accumulate to coexist with a society whose spatial categories rested in ownership of cattle as an expression of wealth.

3. I would like to thank Neil Parsons for pointing out this connection.

4. For some, a still viable option – see Holden in this volume.

5. See also Newitt (1995: pp. 127–46, 228–37) for his account of early spatial/racial relations in Mozambique along the Zambezi River.

6. See Mamdani (1996) on this issue. In this context I want to raise a further point not made by Mamdani but which ties into the analysis he provides. The transition from a 'civilizing mission' colonialism to a 'crowd control' colonialism must, in my opinion, be understood in terms of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1986). Only after the concept of population as an entity became accepted and European racisms became state racism based on biological notions of race does the abandonment of the civilizing mission colonialism make sense. The move towards indirect rule on the basis of 'customary law' is, in effect, the basis on which the entire apartheid construct was built since it implies separate spaces for different races.

7. See Adler and Steinberg (1999) for analyses of the role of NGOs in the political transition of South Africa since 1990.

8. The bulk of the information on the following paragraphs is derived from a personal interview on 28 June 1998 and ongoing communications with Corlett Letlojane, Africa Desk Coordinator of Lawyers for Human Rights, the South African country co-ordinator for SAHRINGON.

9. This experience has led some South African NGOs to take a back seat in regional efforts so as to avoid fostering such a paternalistic image. Personal interview with Vincent Williams, Project Manager, Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town, 15 June 1998.

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